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Courts of Limited Jurisdiction in a
Post-Transition Cuba
Matias F. Travieso-Diaz*
Armando A. Musa**

ABSTRACT.

Cuba's eventual transition to a free-market society will
likely be accompanied by a flood of litigation in areas such as
property rights, privatization of state-owned enterprises, and
human rights violation claims. Courts of limited jurisdiction
should be established to hear these specialized matters and
alleviate the burden on regularcourts. As the transition unfolds,
there will also be a need to create specialized tribunals to handle
disputes in areas such as taxation, bankrtupcy, and intellectual
property. The creation of the various courts of limited
jurisdiction will have to be supported by creative strategies for
retraining existing judges, training new ones, and
supplementing the bench through the appropriateuse of nonjudicial personnel.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Courts in the judicial system of a modern state have different
levels of authority. Legal disputes are originally presented to "lower
courts"; "higher courts" provide a means for reviewing the lower
courts' decisions. Courts are also distinguished by their jurisdictionthat is, the subjects that a court may hear and decide or the parties
who are subject to the court's power. A court's power to hear a case is
dependent on whether it has both subject-matter and personal
jurisdiction. Courts are classified as having one of two types of
subject-matter jurisdiction: (1) general jurisdiction, which confers
upon courts the power to hear all types of controversies or (2) special,
or limited, jurisdiction, which confers upon courts the power to hear
only certain types of cases.'

1.
Sometimes the term "special courts" is used to refer to courts of limited
jurisdiction. "Special courts" has unfortunate connotations, however, because the
designation is often given by totalitarian governments to tribunals set up to persecute
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Judicial institutions
may also exist within executive
departments and other administrative agencies. Administrative
tribunals and boards enforce proposed actions by the agencies against
private parties and hear petitions by private parties seeking redress
for such actions. In many legal systems, those seeking to appeal from
actions by a governmental agency or department are required to
pursue all available remedies within the agency before bringing an
action in a court of general or limited jurisdiction or an appellate
court.
Courts of limited jurisdiction exist in virtually all modern
nations. 2 In the United States, for instance, the federal court system
includes several important courts of limited jurisdiction, including
the U.S. Tax Court, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, the U.S. Court
3
of International Trade, and the U.S. Court of Military Appeals.
Courts of limited jurisdiction exist in Spain 4 and in many Latin
8
7
6
5
American countries, such as Mexico, Chile, Venezuela, and Brazil.
Cuba currently has a unified judicial system consisting of three
levels of courts. 9 At the highest level is the People's Supreme Court,

government opponents or otherwise help commit human rights abuses. See, e.g.,
Sudan: The Legal System, http://countrystudies.us/sudan/65.htm. Therefore, this
Article will not use the "special courts" terminology.
2.
See generally The American Bar Association Central and East European
Law Initiative (CEELI), Concept Paper on Specialized Courts [hereinafter CEELI],
http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/publications/conceptpapers/speccourts/spc.html
(providing
an overview of specialized courts throughout the world).
The concept of limited jurisdiction courts is hardly new. In his description of the
legal system of eighteenth-century England, for example, William Blackstone devoted
an entire chapter to the "courts of a special jurisdiction," which included "forest courts,"
"commissioners of sewers," the "court of policies of assurance" (insurance), and half a
dozen others. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND ch. 6
(1765-69), available at http://www.lonang.com/ exlibris/blackstone/bla-306.htm.
3.
See Gretchen Feltes, Update to A Guide to the U.S. Federal Legal System:
Web-Based Publicly Accessible
Sources (2003),
http://www.llrx.com/features/
us fed2.htm. There are also administrative tribunals within a number of federal and
state government agencies.
4.
See Maria Elisa EscolA, New Bankruptcy Act in Spain, THE BULLET "ILN"
NEWSLETTrER, Dec. 29, 2004, http://www.imninc.com/ilnnew~bankruptcy-act-spain.pdf
(discussing the creation of bankruptcy courts in Spain under this Act).
5.
See Mexican Legal System
Overview, http://www.mexonline.com/
lawreview.htm.
6.
See JURIST Chile: Chilean Law, Legal Research, Human Rights,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edulworld/chile.htm.
7.
See Venezuela: The Judiciary, http://www.photius.com/countries/venezuela/
government/venezuela.government thejudiciary.html.
8.
See Brazil: The Judiciary, http://www.country-studies.comlbrazil/thejudiciary.html.
9.
See Ley de Organizaci6n del Poder Judicial No. 1250, June 23, 1973. This
law was amended first by the Ley de Organizaci6n del Sistema Judicial, Law No. 4,
published August 25, 1977, and subsequently by the Ley Sobre los Tribunales
Populares, Law No. 70, published July 24, 1990. The economic chambers of the
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which is divided into six different chambers: (1) criminal, (2) civil and
administrative, (3) labor, (4) state security, (5) military, and (6)
economic.10 The People's Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo Popular)
oversees the operation of the entire court system, but it lacks the
power to review the actions of the executive and legislative
branches. 1 The next level of courts is the People's Provincial Courts
(TribunalesProvinciales Populares); one such court is located in each
of the fourteen provinces. 12 The provincial courts have initial
jurisdiction over major crimes and serve as courts of appeal for the
third and lowest level of courts: the People's Municipal Courts
(Tribunales Municipiales Populares).13 The 169 municipal courts are
and have
the principal trial courts in the Cuban judicial system
14
initial jurisdiction over civil and minor criminal matters.
Other than the chambers into which the People's Supreme Court
is divided, Cuba has no permanent courts of limited jurisdiction. The
Cuban government, however, has established at various times
(particularly in the first decade of the Revolution) ad hoc "people's
courts" and "revolutionary tribunals," largely intended to replace
regular courts and provide summary handling of certain matters,
15
especially criminal proceedings against opponents of the regime.
Setting up courts of limited jurisdiction will be a virtual
necessity during the transition period in Cuba. Many lawsuits can be
expected to be initiated during that period. Indeed, Cuba could
experience a surge in litigation similar to those that occurred in other
countries transitioning from socialism.' 6 Unless measures are taken
to expedite judicial proceedings, there could be lengthy delays in the
adjudication of cases.
The growing caseload will likely require that temporary courts
and other judicial institutions having limited jurisdiction be
established during the early phase of the transition to handle some of

Supreme Court and the Provincial Courts were established by Legislative Decree 129,
De Extinci6n del Sistema de Arbitraje Estatal, published August 19, 1991. Law 82 on
the Popular Courts, promulgated in 1997, modified Law 70.
10.
See Ley de Organizaci6n del Poder Judicial No. 1250, June 23, 1973.
Luis P. Salas, The Maintenance of Internal Order in Cuba: The
11.
Administration of Justice During the Special Period, in TRANSITION IN CUBA: NEW
CHALLENGES FOR U.S. POLICY 251 (Lisandro Perez ed., 1993); Laura Patallo Sdnchez,
The Role of the Judiciary In A Post-Castro Cuba: Recommendations For Change, 7-8
(2003), http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/ResearchStudies/LPatalloJudiciary.pdf.
12.
Patallo Sdnchez, supra note 11, at 9.
13.
Id. at 9-10.
14.

Id. at 9.

15.
See id.
For example, in 1991 alone 700,000 new lawsuits were filed in Hungary
16.
and 121,000 in Czechoslovakia. Cheryl W. Gray et al., Evolving Legal Frameworks for
Private Sector Development in Central and Eastern Europe, 209 World Bank Discussion
Papers 58, 86 (1993).
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the more frequently litigated matters (e.g., disputes involving
property ownership issues). Courts of limited jurisdiction of a more
permanent nature will also need to be created to hear cases where the
subject matter is of a specialized nature (e.g., tax cases).
This Article seeks to identify some of the most important courts
and quasi-judicial tribunals that will need to be established during
Cuba's transition to a free market democracy. This Article does not
intend to provide a comprehensive examination of judicial
administration needs in a post-transition era. Rather, this Article
seeks to illustrate the challenges that a transition government will
17
face in providing an adequate legal infrastructure.

II. COURTS OF LIMITED JURISDICTION AND LIMITED DURATION
A. Introduction
The transition period in Cuba will witness profound changes to
the country's political, social, and economic structures.1 8 Some of
those changes-for example, the privatization of state-owned
enterprises (SOE)-will be "one time only" initiatives that will be
accomplished over a relatively short period of time, whereas others
will be permanent modifications requiring the establishment of
enduring structures for their implementation.
This Part discusses those courts and quasi-judicial tribunals
whose function will be to support the short term needs of the
transition. Such courts and tribunals will of necessity have limited
jurisdiction and will be disbanded once the special need requiring
their institution has been accomplished.

17.
For a more detailed discussion of the changes that will need to be made to
Cuba's legal infrastructure during a free-market transition, see MATIAS TRAVIESODIAZ, THE LAWS AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF A FREE-MARKET CUBA: A PROSPECTUS FOR
BUSINESS ch. 3 (1997) [hereinafter THE LAWs AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF A FREE-MARKET
CUBA].

18.
The political, social, and economic changes that will need to take place in a
transition period in Cuba have been thoroughly analyzed by a number of experts over
the last fifteen years and are reflected in, for example, the papers presented at the
annual meetings of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE). See
Association For the Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE), ASCE Annual Proceedings,
http:/llanic.utexas.edulprojectlasce/publications/proceedings/.
A seminal assessment of the economic changes that must take place during the
transition was provided by the late Felipe Pazos in 1990. Felipe Pazos, Problemas
Econdmicos de Cuba en el
Periodo de Transici6n, Dec.
28,
1990,
http://lanic.utexas.edula/cb/cuba/asce/cubal/pazos2.html.
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B. PropertyRight Adjudication Courts
As is well known, during the early years of its Revolution, 19591963, Cuba expropriated the assets of foreign nationals in the
country. 19 While Cuba has settled over time the expropriation claims
of the nationals of several countries, 20 the most significant claimsthose of corporations and individuals who were U.S. nationals at the
time of the property seizures-remain outstanding and represent a
very large potential liability for the state. Applying a six percent
simple interest rate to the $1.8 billion principal in certified claims
yields a present value for the expropriation claims by U.S. nationals
of approximately $6.7 billion as of July 2005.21
Resolution of the U.S. claims issue may not be practicable while
the current socialist regime is in power in Cuba. Cuban officials have
periodically expressed a willingness to discuss settlement of the
claims issue with the United States; 22 however, such willingness is
usually expressed in the context of setting off those claims against
Cuba's alleged right to recover from the United States hundreds of
billions of dollars in damages due to the U.S. trade embargo and
other alleged acts of aggression against Cuba. 23 To date, the Cuban

19.

MICHAEL W. GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS: THE DEMISE OF

PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CUBA ch. 3 (1975) (describing in detail the history of the Cuban
expropriation process). For a more detailed discussion of the expropriation claims issue,
see TRAVIESO-DIAZ, supra note 17, ch. 4.
The expropriations of the assets of foreign nationals led to the submittal of claims
by the affected parties before their respective governments. See generally Michael W.
Gordon, The Settlement of Claims for Expropriated Foreign Private Property Between
Cuba and Foreign Nations other than the United States, 5 L. Am. 457 (1973). In the
United States, a federal agency known as the Federal Claims Settlement Commission
(FCSC) received evidence of, and assessed claims by, thousands of U.S. nationals
whose properties in Cuba were confiscated. See id. The FCSC certified 5,911 claims
with a total value of $1.8 billion in 1960 dollars. See id. Investments by nationals of
other countries amounted to $350 million by Spanish nationals and approximately $10
million each for nationals of France, Canada, and Switzerland. See id.
20.
Cuba has entered into settlement agreements with five foreign countries for
the expropriation of the assets of their respective nationals in Cuba: France, March 16,
1967; Switzerland, March 2, 1967; United Kingdom, October 18, 1978; Canada,
November 7, 1980; and Spain, January 26, 1988. See http://www.cubavsbloqueo.cu; see
also Gordon, The Settlement of Claims, supranote 19.
21.
In its examination of the Cuban expropriation claims, the FCSC
determined that simple interest at a 6% rate should be included as part of the value of
the claims it certified. Gordon, The Settlement of Claims, supra note 19.
22.
See, e.g., Alarcon: Nation 'U.S. Protectorate' With Helms Burton Bill,
PRENSA LATINA, Nov. 1, 1995, reprinted in FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE,
LAT-95-215, Nov. 7, 1995, at 1.

23.
This position is expressly set forth in Cuba's Law 80 of 1996, the "Law on
the Reaffirmation of Cuban Dignity and Sovereignty," whose Art. 3 reads in relevant
part:
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government has given no indication that it is prepared to negotiate,
without preconditions, a potential settlement of the U.S.
expropriation claims with the United States.
For that reason, the expropriation claims of those who were U.S.
nationals at the time their properties in Cuba were seized are likely
to achieve resolution only after the country makes a transition to a
free market society. The expropriation claims of those individuals and
corporations who were Cuban nationals at the time their properties
were taken also remain outstanding and are likely to greatly exceed
the claims of the U.S. nationals in both number and amount.
Many solutions have been proposed to address the pending
expropriation claims. 24 All of the proposed solutions have in common
the likely resort to the courts by, among others, individuals or entities
asserting conflicting ownership claims against the same asset,
claimants dissatisfied with the disposition given to their claims, and
former property owners suing foreign investors who have conducted
business utilizing or otherwise involving the expropriated assets
25
during the current regime.

The claims for compensation for the expropriation of U.S. properties in Cuba
nationalized through that legitimate process, validated by Cuban law and
international law referred to in the preceding article, may be part of a
negotiation process between the Government of the United States and the
Government of the Republic of Cuba, on the basis of equality and mutual
respect.
The indemnification claims due to the nationalization of said properties shall
be examined together with the indemnification to which the Cuban state and
the Cuban people are entitled as a result of the damages caused by the
economic blockade and the acts of aggression of all nature which are the
responsibility of the Government of the United States of America.
Ley de Reafirmaci6n de la Dignidad y Soberania Cubanas No. 80, Dec. 24, 1996
(English language translation appears at 36 I.L.M. 472 (1997)).
24.
Oscar M. Garibaldi & John D. Kirby, Property Rights in the Post-Castro
Cuban Constitution, in

EXPROPRIATED PROPERTIES IN A POST-CASTRO CUBA: Two

VIEWS 25 (Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami,
2003); Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Alternative Recommendations for Dealing with
Confiscated Property in Post-Castro Cuba, in EXPROPRIATED PROPERTIES IN A POSTCASTRO CUBA 77-81(2003) [hereinafter, Travieso-Diaz, Alternative Recommendations];
Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Alternative Remedies In A Negotiated Settlement Of The U.S.
Nationals' Expropriation Claims Against Cuba, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L. BUS. L. 659 (1996);
see Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Some Legal and Practical Issues in the Resolution of
Cuban Nationals' Expropriation Claims Against Cuba, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 217
(1995).
25.
Starting in about 1990, the Cuban government began to promote foreign
investment in the island and encouraged the formation of joint ventures between
foreign entrepreneurs and the state or government-owned entities. See Cuba Adds Red
Tape for Foreign Investors, CUBANEWS, Feb. 2005, § 2, at 12. Over four hundred
enterprises involving foreign investors were established over the years, although the
number of ventures in existence has been falling rapidly since 2002. Id. For a
description of Cuba's foreign investment program, see Matias F. Travieso-Diaz,
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For example, one of the claim resolution mechanisms that
commentators have supported is the restitution of the expropriated
assets to their former owners.2 6 Restitution methods have been used
in a number of countries making the transition from socialism to a
free market society. 27 Implementation of a restitution program,
however, would almost inevitably lead to controversies among
potential claimants to the property, 28 between the claimants and
other users or occupiers of the property, 29 and between the claimants
and the state (to the extent that adjustments are made for the
increase or diminution in the value of the property during state
30
possession).
Indeed, the experience of countries that have embraced
restitution as the way to solve the property claims issue reveals that
implementation of a restitution program leads to thousands of suits
being filed. 31 If ordinary courts are given the task of adjudicating

Alternative Recommendations, supra note 24, at 68, and see also Matias F. TraviesoDiaz and Charles P. Trumbull IV, Foreign Investment In Cuba: ProspectsAnd Perils,
35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L REV. 903 (2003).
26.
See, e.g., Garibaldi & Kirby, supra note 24, at 25 (suggesting that the
expropriations carried out by the Cuban government in the early days of the
Revolution violated the 1940 Constitution and international law and therefore
restitution of the assets to the former owners is the required remedy).
27.
Restitution has been used as the remedy of choice for expropriations in
many countries in central and eastern Europe, including Germany, Czechoslovakia, the
Baltic republics, Bulgaria and Romania. See Frances H. Foster, Post-Soviet Approaches
to Restitution: Lessons for Cuba, in CUBA IN TRANSITION: OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING THE
CHALLENGE OF EXPROPRIATED PROPERTIES 93 (JoAnn Klein ed., 1994).
28.
Since most of the expropriations took place forty-five or more years ago, it
is highly probable that the original owners of the property will be deceased (or, in the
case of corporations, will be dissolved, merged or otherwise changed in identity). See
Emilio Cueto, Property Claims of Cuban Nationals, Remarks at the Shaw, Pittman,
Potts & Trowbridge Workshop on Resolution of Property Claims in Cuba's Transition
4-5 (Jan. 1995) (transcript on file with Authors). For that reason, disputes as to who is
the rightful successor in interest to the property are likely to arise as restitution of the
confiscated properties is attempted. See id.
29.
Over the course of their occupation by the state, many properties have
been subdivided, conveyed to third parties, or occupied illegally by individuals who
may claim title to them by adverse possession. See Travieso-Diaz, Alternative
Recommendations, supra note 24, at 68; Juan C. Consuegra-Barquin, The Present
Status Quo of Property Rights in Cuba, ASCE
195, 200-05 (1995),
http:/Ianic.utexas.edulacb/cuba/asce/cuba5/FILE15.PDF (paper presented at the 5th
Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, Miami,
Florida in Aug. 1995); Cueto, supra note 28, at 8-9. In addition, many foreign investors
have acquired rights to assets in the process of investing in Cuba, and are likely to
assert these rights against those of the former owners. See Matias F. Travieso-Diaz &
Armando A. Musa, Cat on a Hot Tin Roof: The Status of Current Foreign Investors in a
Post-TransitionCuba, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.R. 885, 895 (2005).
30.
TRAVIESO-DIAZ, supra note 17, ch. 4; Travieso-Diaz, Alternative
Recommendations, supra note 24, at 69; Cueto, supra note 28, at 7.
31.
In Romania, for example, restitution of agricultural land led to more than
300,000 court cases. Gray et al., supra note 16, at 4.
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disputes arising from the restitution program, paralysis of the court
32
system may result.
A number of countries have sought to diminish the potential
impact of litigation arising from expropriation claims by establishing
administrative agencies or boards charged with adjudicating such
claims. This has been done, for example, in Germany 33 and the Baltic
republics of Latvia, 34 Lithuania, 35 and Estonia. 36 Resorting to
administrative bodies (particularly local bodies) has the potential
drawback of referring the resolution of sometimes complex legal
issues to untrained personnel who may be vulnerable to political
pressures and who potentially would have to divide their time and
attention between restitution issues and other administrative duties.
Even if other remedies besides restitution are implemented,
disputes could arise in the course of their implementation. For
example, where compensation is offered, the amount of the
compensation (whether in cash, government obligations, or other
instruments) is typically tied to the assessed value of the
expropriated assets. 37 Disputes as to the appropriateness of the value
assigned to the property are likely to arise and require adjudication
by the courts.38 And, if a negotiated settlement of the claim is reached

32.
In the former Czechoslovakia, for example, restitution led to numerous
disputes between original owners and current occupants, as well as disputes between
competing claimants, resulting in clogged courts. See id. at 49; see also Anna Gelpern,
The Laws and Politics of Reprivatization in East-CentralEurope: A Comparison, 14 U.
PA. J. INT'L. Bus. L. 315, 324-28 (1993).
33.
See Roland Czada, The Treuhandanstaltand the Transitionfrom Socialism
to Capitalism, in A NEW GERMAN PUBLIC SECTOR? REFORM, ADAPTION AND STABILITY
93-117 (Arther Benz & Klaus H. Goetz eds., 1996),http://www.politik.uniosnabrueck.de/POLSYS/Archive/ Treuhandanstact.htm (discussing the establishment
of the Treuhandanstatand its role in transforming Germany from a socialist to market
economy, including the restitution of municipal and private properties).
34.
See Frances Foster, Restitution of Expropriated Property: Post-Soviet
Lessons for Cuba, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 621, 627, 633 (1996) (discussing the use
of legislation regarding the resolution of expropriation claims).
35.
See William Valetta, Completing the Transition:Lithuania Nears the End
of its Land Restitution and Reform Program, 11 FAO LEGAL PAPERS ONLINE (2000),
http://www.fao.orgfLegal/prs-ol/lpol 1.pdf
(describing the legislative
basis for
Lithuania's land restitution and reform movement).
36.
See Alari Pojaru, The Political Economy of Privatisation in Estonia,
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM AND TRANSFORMATION (1996), http://www.som.hw.
ac.uklcertlwpa/1996/dp9602.htm (identifying the most important features of the
legislation that determined the plan of privatization in Estonia).
37.
See, e.g., Gray et al., supra note 16, at 70; Travieso-Diaz, Alternative
Recommendations, supra note 24, at 70-71.
38.
In Hungary, for example, where compensation in the form of state-issued
vouchers was the main mechanism used to address expropriation claims, compensation
was handled through local compensation offices, subject to appeal to a Hungarian
National Compensation Office and review by the civil courts. See Gelpern, supra note
32, at 343, 347-48.
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between the claimant and the state, disputes may arise as to whether
the state's (or the claimant's) obligations under the settlement
39
agreement have been properly discharged.
Given the large number and contentious nature of the claims
that can be expected to be asserted in Cuba, it would probably be
necessary to establish either an independent agency of the Cuban
government with jurisdiction over both the determination of the
validity of claims to title over confiscated property and the
dispensation of remedies or a system of courts whose jurisdiction
would be limited to the resolution of property expropriation claims
and the adjudication of disputes relating to them. 40 To deal with
potential shortages of judges to staff the courts, the tribunals could
include lawyers as well as non-lawyers, as long as the head of the
tribunal is a judge or a licensed legal practitioner. Part IV of this
Article addresses this subject in greater detail.
The case of Nicaragua represents an instructive yet cautionary
example of using courts to adjudicate expropriation claims. After the
transition from the socialist Sandinista government to the democratic
government of Violeta Chamorro in 1990, owners of land expropriated
during the Sandinista rule began to demand restitution of their
property or compensation for the takings. 4 1 Restitution presented a
difficult problem in Nicaragua, where about one-fourth of all
agricultural land and many urban properties had been seized, and no
42
clear records of ownership were maintained.
In 1990, Agrarian Commissions were created at the
departmental and municipal levels to resolve disputes between
individuals claiming rights to the same property. 4 3 Another agency,
the National Review Commission, was established to deal with claims
of governmental takings of land from original owners and to provide
for the restitution of illegally seized lands. 44 Appeals from the
decisions of these agencies were to be heard by the courts. 45 The
volume of claims was enormous: by 1992, about forty percent of the
46
households in Nicaragua were involved in an ownership dispute.
Furthermore, Nicaraguans questioned the legality of the Agrarian

39.
See Travieso-Diaz, Alternative Recommendations, supra note 24, at 64-67.
40.
Id. at 83.
41.
The Carter Center, Nicaraguan Property Disputes (April 1995),
http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/l1199.pdf
42.
Brian Trackman et al., The Reform of Property Registration Systems in
Nicaragua: A Status Report, June 11, 1999, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/
prs/Nicar.html.
43.
See J. David Stanfield & Steven E. Hendrix, Ownership Insecurity in
Nicaragua,22 CAP. U. L. REV. 939, 949 (1993).
44.

Id.

45.

See The Carter Center, supra note 41, at 6.

46.

Id.
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Commissions and the National Review Commission. 47 When
claimants were not pleased with administrative decisions, they often
took matters into their own hands, bringing the administrative
process to a standstill and sparking violent confrontations between
48
conflicting owners.
The judicial system was likewise ill-equipped to deal with this
number of disputes. 49 By 1995, there were an estimated 6,000 present
and potential property dispute claims filed in the courts, a number
50
which threatened to create a crisis in the court system.
In 1997, the government of Arnoldo Alem~n, successor to
Chamorro, established four property tribunals (salas de propiedad),
to handle expropriation cases. 51 The property tribunals conduct
mediations, binding arbitrations, and expedited trials of property
cases. 52 Upon conclusion of the mediation, arbitration, or trial, the
tribunals forward their decisions to the regular courts, which issue
orders containing the terms of the mediation, arbitration, or trial
53
results.
The caseload of the property tribunals has included a significant
number of claims filed by U.S. citizens. By 2003, the tribunals had
received more than 4,600 claims from U.S. citizens, of which 3,700
54
claims had been settled and over 900 claims remained outstanding.
Currently, there are eighteen U.S. citizens with pending claims
55
before the property tribunal.

47.
A year after the establishment of the National Review Commission, the
Nicaraguan Supreme Court decided that parts of the decree authorizing the
Commission were unconstitutional. Stanfield & Hendrix, supra note 43, at 949.
48.
Id.
49.
See id. at 960 (stating that the normal court system could take years to
decide these cases).
50.
Id.; see also The Carter Center, supra note 41, at 6.
51.
See CENTER ON HOUSING RIGHTS AND EVICTIONS ET AL., HOUSING RIGHTS
IN NICARAGUA: HISTORICAL COMPLEXITIES AND CURRENT CHALLENGES 55 (2004),

available at www.cohre.org/downloadsfMissionReport-Nicaragua- English. pdf. What
was supposed to have been a sixty day period of adjustment during which no new
actions could be brought became an almost three-year freeze until, under U.S.
government pressure, the courts started accepting cases in July 2000. Personal
Communication from Le6nidas Henriquez Portillo, Senior Property Assistant, U.S.
Embassy, Managua, (July 7, 2005) [hereinafter Henriquez] (on file with Authors).
52.
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Nicaragua: Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices, DEP'T ST. BULL. § 1(f) (2003), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rlshrrpt/2002/ 18339.htm.
53.
Id. In November 2002, the Supreme Court consolidated the five tribunals
into a single one because of budgetary constraints. Id.
54.

INDUSTRY CANADA, NICARAGUA COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE FY 2003 ch.

7 (2003), available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inimr-ri.nsf/engrll0522e.
html. Industry Canada reported that the tribunals consistently rule against the
original owners. Id.
55.
Henriquez, supra note 51. New legislation, introduced in November 2004
and going into effect in January 2005, transferred responsibility for land titling,
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The Nicaraguan Property Tribunal has some attractive features
that could be adopted in Cuba, such as court-supervised referral to
alternative dispute resolution and the division of responsibilities
between specialized courts that rule on the claims and the regular
court system to administer the awards. On the other hand, the
tribunals, like other branches of Nicaragua's judicial system, have
been criticized for bias and a lack of independence; they are seen as
favoring current property holders and as being subject to political
manipulation. Such risks may be faced in a transitional Cuba and
should be taken into account both in the selection of the members of
the tribunals and in the establishment of guidelines to assure the
tribunals' fairness and independence.
C. PrivatizationProgram Courts
The term "privatization" can be defined as the transfer or sale of
56
any asset, function, or activity from the public to the private sector.
More narrowly defined, privatization means the conveyance of
ownership of all or part of an SOE or its assets from the public sector
57
to private parties.
There is little doubt that, in moving from the current socialist
economic structure to an open and free market economy, Cuba will
need to privatize many, if not all, of its SOEs. 58 The emergence of
private enterprise will stimulate economic growth and reduce chronic
shortages, and the assumption of ownership by private parties over
loss-generating enterprises will also ease the strain on the national
treasury as well as generate revenues for the country. For those

payment of compensation for confiscations, and administration of public lands, from
the Finance Ministry to a National Assembly-appointed Property Institute. See
Asemblea Nacional de Nicaragua, http://www.asamblea.gob.ni. The law contains a
provision that halts for 180 days, while the Institute is established, all ongoing
property civil and criminal judicial proceedings as well as the enforcement of
judgments in property cases. The last time a similar provision was written in a
property law resulted in property cases being deferred for almost three years.
Henriquez, supranote 51.
56.

ERNST & YOUNG, PRIVATIZATION: INVESTING IN STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES

AROUND THE WORLD 4 (1994). This definition encompasses "joint public-private
ventures, concession leases, management contracts, as well as some specialized
instruments, such as build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) agreements." Id. Outsourcing
of government functions and services (e.g., water supply) is also included in this
definition. Id.
57.
Richard M. Phillips & Marian G. Dent, Privatizing Eastern Europe: A
Challengefor the Nineties, in JOINT VENTURES AND PRIVATIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE
448-49 (1991).

58.
Few, if any, sectors of the Cuban economy appear to be so sensitive that
they should be under the exclusive control of the state, or seem to be better run by the
state than by the private sector. See generally TRAVIESO-DIAZ, supra note 17, ch. 6.
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reasons, a privatization9 program is likely to be undertaken early in
5
the transition process.
There are many ways in which the privatization of SOEs can be
accomplished, and the decision as to the method to be used for a
particular enterprise involves economic and policy factors in addition
to legal considerations. The choice among privatization methods may
also be influenced by which techniques are judged to be most
appropriate to attract investors.
The scope of the privatization process may also vary. At one end
of the spectrum is the complete transfer of ownership of the SOE to
one or more private parties. At the other end, there are varying
degrees of limited privatization in which the state retains an
ownership interest in the enterprise, but private sector involvement
is sought in the operation of all or portions of the company. Methods
used in the outright sale of an SOE to private investors include:
auction, negotiated sale, tender, stock floatation, stock distribution,
voucher or coupon privatization, and management or employee
buyout. 60 Limited privatization methods include joint ventures, buildown-operate-and-transfer agreements, leases, and management
61
contracts.
The wide choice of privatization alternatives dictates that a
government entity, usually an independent agency, must be
responsible for the administration of the privatization program.
Almost all the countries making the transition from socialism to a
free market economy have established a privatization agency, and it
62
is the actions of such an agency that are subject to judicial review.
For purposes of this Article, the issue of concern is what form
such a review should take. In most countries, the acts of the
privatization agency are reviewable--if at all-in the ordinary court
system. That raises a administration of justice concern, albeit of a
different nature than that posed by the property expropriations. The
problem is not the number of cases, but the potential complexity of
the issues raised in connection with a privatization decision.
Some of the decisions that a privatization agency needs to make
and that are potentially subject to judicial challenge, include the
following:

59.

Id.

60.
61.

ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 56, at 17.
Id. at 17-18.

See TRAVIESO-DIAZ, supra note 17, ch. 6 (discussing the experiences in
62.
various countries with the creation of governmental agencies to oversee the
privatization process).
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Whether the enterprise should be sold, turned over to the
workers or managers, returned to former owners, merged with
other enterprises, or liquidated.
If the enterprise is to be sold, whether a negotiated sale, a
competitive bidding process, or some other mechanism is to be
used.
The assessed value of the enterprise, taking into account both
assets and current and potential liabilities.
If the enterprise is sold by a negotiated agreement, the terms of
the sale, the identity of the purchaser and its connections, if
any, to any government official or other party involved in the
privatization process.
If competitive bidding is used, the format of the bidding process
(i.e., whether bids are to be opened in public).
The identities of the parties rejected (especially when the
chosen party is a foreigner and the rejected party is a national
or an employee group).
The identity of the selected bidder and any links between the
bidder and any government official or other party involved in
the privatization process.
The terms of the agreement (e.g., price, form, terms and
conditions for payment of the purchase price, types of
concessions, debts devolving on the government itself,
conditions of the investment, and the operations the investor
agrees to maintain).
Any formal or substantive irregularities in the process of
63
selecting the purchaser.

As this list of issues illustrates, a reviewing court faced with a
challenge to the privatization of an SOE (by, for example, an
unsuccessful bidder) must be capable of delving into highly technical
issues and must also rule impartially on allegations of favoritism,
lack of transparency, and corruption. 64 These requirements can best
be met by establishing a court or courts of limited jurisdiction having
the sole responsibility of providing an independent review of the
65
privatization decisions.

63.

V.V.

Ramanadham,

The

Monitoring and Regulatory Aspects

of

Privatization,in PRIVATIZATION AND AFTER 11 (V.V. Ramanadham ed., 1994).

64.
There are many examples of lack of transparency in the privatization
process. See id. at 10. In Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Guyana, for example, complaints
were lodged over sales of SOEs under terms that were either unfavorable or tainted
with allegations of corruption. Id.
65.
The ability to expertly handle cases requiring specialized expertise is one of
the reasons frequently cited in favor of the establishment of courts of special
jurisdiction. Other advantages include greater overall court efficiency, uniformity of
results, improved case management, elimination of conflicts and forum shopping,
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Courts of limited jurisdiction have been set up in Russia and
other successor countries to the former Soviet Union to review the
actions of the privatization agencies. 66 The Russian government has
allocated authority over privatization disputes to the arbitrazh
courts.67 Arbitrazh courts are part of the judicial system and also
hear disputes between commercial entities and between commercial
entities and the state. 68 The arbitrazh court system comprises district
arbitrazh courts that operate as the trial courts of counties or
important cities, regional arbitrazhcourts, that function as appellate
courts, and an arbitrazh court of final jurisdiction. 69 During Soviet
rule, the arbitrazh courts served as quasi-judicial administrative
tribunals unconnected to the court system.7 0 Russian judicial reform
in 1992, however, reconstituted the arbitrazh courts as permanent
legitimate courts and granted them jurisdiction to hear commercial
7 1
disputes and challenges to privatization actions.
Despite their grant of jurisdiction, arbitrazh courts have limited
enforcement powers. 72 They lack the power to impose sanctions or
order the sale of property to force compliance with their orders. 73 In
addition, arbitrazhcourts do not have injunctive powers. 74 For those
reasons, claimants often avoid the arbitrazh courts, resorting to
75
informal political channels for resolution of their complaints.
The negative experience in Russia with arbitrazh courts serves
to illustrate the requirements of a successful system of limited
jurisdiction courts to review an agency's privatization decisions. The

increased flexibility, and the ability to exercise continued oversight of the functions of
administrative agencies. See CEELI, supra note 2, § I, C.
66.
Id. § I, B.
67.
See Kathryn Hendley, Symposium: Economic, Legal and Political
Dilemmas of Privatization in Russia: The Spillover Effects of Privatization on Russian
Legal Culture, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, 53 (1995). The arbitrazh are
not arbitration courts, as the false cognate suggests. Eugene Gorchakov, Resolution of
Commercial Disputes in Russia: Choosing the Best Alternative, Nov. 2000,
http://www.bisnis.doc.govfbisnis/country/001120rsdisres.htm.
68.
Hendley, supra note 67, at 61.
69.
Randy M. Wright, Enforcing Contractual Obligations and Resolving
Commercial Disputes in Russia, http://www.berrymoorman.com/articles/speech.html.
70.
Peter H. Solomon, Jr., Courts in Russia: Independence, Power and
Accountability (unnoted draft May 5, 2001), http://www.ceu.hu/legalSolomon.htm.
71.
Russia placed administration of the privatization process in the hands of
the Russian Federal Property Fund. See Official Website of the Russian Federal
Property Fund, http://www.fpf.ru. The Fund is a specialized financial institution that,
in accordance with Russian legislation, is responsible for selling privatized federal
property. Id. The Fund has authority to make decisions on property claims and the sale
and purchase of confiscated property. Id.
72.
Hendley, supra note 67, at 60-61.
73.
Id.
74.
Id. at 61.
75.
Id. at 60-61.
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courts must be granted injunctive powers that allow them to block a
prospective privatization, order the conveyance of enterprise
property, direct that a negotiated sale be overturned, or reopen a
bidding process. The courts must also be staffed with competent,
impartial judges, and adequate support staff.
D. Handlingof Human Rights Claims
Transition to democracy, whether from a communist or other
oppressive regime, has historically been accompanied by a surge of
claims against the state and its former officials for violations of
human rights. 76 After half a century of totalitarian rule in Cuba it
should be anticipated that, if allowed, a myriad of human rights
violation claims would be leveled against the state and against
officials of the current socialist government.
This Article takes no position on whether legal claims arising
from human rights violations should be permitted in a post-transition
Cuba. Should such claims be allowed, however, there is ample
international precedent for the setting up of limited jurisdiction
courts and agencies to handle the claims. Some examples of the
available options follow.
1. Special Agency: The Ethiopian Special Prosecutor's Office
Ethiopia created a Special Prosecutor's Office (SPO) with a
mandate to investigate and prosecute atrocities committed by the
Dergue, the military council that ruled Ethiopia during 1974-1991-a
period known as the "Red Terror." 77 Ethiopia administered claims
against the state and its former officials through its regular court
system. The SPO, created in 1992, has more than four hundred
employees with forty-five Ethiopian prosecutors and eight foreign
advisors. 78 Since 1992, the SPO had interviewed 5,000 witnesses and
collected more than 300,000 documents. 79 In 1994, it charged top
officials of the Dergue with genocide and crimes against humanity
pursuant to the Ethiopian penal and criminal procedure codes. 80 The
SPO brought its claims to the Central High Court, an appellate level

76.
See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE,
at xv-xx (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002) (analyzing the administration of justice after
conflicts in countries such as Cambodia and Sierra Leone).
77.
Wondwossen L. Kidane, The Ethiopian "Red Terror" Trials, in POSTCONFLICT JUSTICE, supra note 76, at 667-68.
78.
Id. at 671-72.
79.
Id. at 671.
80.
Id. at 672.
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court established by the transitional government in 1991 and later
81
renamed the Federal High Court by the 1995 Federal Constitution.
2. Special Agency Plus Limited Jurisdiction Court: Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone endured a violent civil war between 1991 and
Fighting between the Revolutionary United Front and the
Sierra Leone Army killed more than 75,000 people, displaced twothirds of the country's population, and terrorized thousands of
others.8 3 In 2002, the newly elected government of Sierra Leone,
assisted by the United Nations, set up two bodies to administer
justice to victims of wartime atrocities: the Truth and Reconciliation
84
Commission (TRC) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
The TRC has the mandate to investigate human rights violations
committed during the war, hear the stories of victims of the
8 5
violations, and create a historical record of the abuses committed.
Although not a court, the TRC has capabilities that make it a quasijudicial body.8 6 It can request or compel production of reports and
records from any source-including domestic and foreign government
entities and officials-as part of its information gathering. 87 It can
also conduct confidential interviews of individuals and members of
organizations. 88 The TRC has the power to require that statements be
made under oath and to administer such oaths.8 9 It can issue both
summons and subpoenas and compel appearance. 90 It can also visit
any location without prior notice to gather information, perform
inspections, and obtain copies of documents. 9 1
The TRC also has contempt powers. 92 Failure to respond to a
summons or subpoena issued by the TRC may lead to trial or
punishment by a court. 93 A citizen or member of the government who
2000.82

81.
82.

Id. at 675-76.
See Jennifer L. Poole, Post Conflict Justice in Sierra Leone, in POST-

CONFLICT JUSTICE, supra note 76, at 563.
83.
See id. at 563-64.

84.
See id. at 563, 577, 580. The TRC was established as part of the Lom6
Peace Agreement of 1999, while the Special Court was established under the
Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the
Establishment of a Special Court of Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002. Id. at 577, 583-84,
n. 149. The agreement is available online at http://sierra-leone.org/ Laws/2002-9.pdf.
85.
Id. at 577-78.
86.
Id. at 578.
87.

Id.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 578-79.
Id. at 579.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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fails to assist the TRC or obstructs its functions faces a fine or up to
94
one year of imprisonment.
Sierra Leone also established a special court as a temporary,
independent tribunal of limited jurisdiction. 95 The Special Court for
Sierra Leone has the power to prosecute the perpetrators of serious
violations of Sierra Leonean law and international humanitarian
law. 96 The court's chamber is composed of judges from across the
world and from Sierra Leone. 9 7 Moreover, the Special Court has
concurrent jurisdiction with national courts, but enjoys supremacy
over them and has the power to issue binding orders to the
98
government of Sierra Leone.
For two reasons, the Special Court has jurisdiction only to
punish the most notorious perpetrators. First, the drafters of the
court's mandate wanted to ensure that child combatants, who were
themselves victims of human rights violations, were not tried before
the tribunal. 99 Second, the Special Court, which is funded by
voluntary contributions from the international community, lacks the
financial resources to conduct many full-blown trials. 10 0 The work of
the TRC is intended to make up for the Special Court's jurisdictional
limitations by investigating less serious abuses of human rights. 10 1
The TRC is also better suited to reintegrate former combatantsincluding child soldiers-into society, restoring normality. 10 2 Thus,
the TRC and the Special Court play complementary roles.' 0 3 The
Special Court fulfills the need for criminal prosecution in serious
04
cases, while the TRC serves to facilitate reconciliation.1
3. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: South Africa
A number of countries (including Argentina, Chile, El Salvador,
and Guatemala) have established TRCs following the transition from
totalitarian to democratic regimes. 105 Although their charters vary,

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
See id. at 580, 582.
Id. at 582.
Id. at 585.
Id. at 584-85.
Id. at 590.
Id.
Id. at 590-91.
Id.
Id. at 591.

104.

Id.

105.
See Anurima Bhargava, Note, Defining Political Crimes: A Case Study of the
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1304, 1307
(2002). See also Strategic Choices in the Design of Truth Commissions, Design Factors,
http://www.truthcommission.org/factor.php?fid-2&mode=m&lang--en (providing a table
of mandate dimensions of various TRCs).
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TRCs are usually set up to investigate and expose human rights
abuses that occurred under a totalitarian regime that is no longer in
power.
The South African TRC is the most cited and probably most
successful example of such an investigative body. That TRC was
established by the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation
Act of 1995 after the end of apartheid and was charged with
compiling a historical record of the causes, nature, and extent of
human rights violations during the apartheid regime.10 6 The South
African TRC was divided into three branches: an Amnesty
Committee, which heard amnesty applications; a Human Rights
Committee, which provided a forum for the victims of human rights
abuses to tell their stories; and a Rehabilitation and Reparations
Committee, which put forward recommendations regarding the
transformation of civil institutions and the grant of reparations to the
10 7
victims.
The South African TRC differed from others in that it possessed
quasi-judicial powers, such as the power to subpoena witnesses and
conduct searches and seizures.10 8 The TRC was to follow procedures
established by the National Unity and Reconciliation Act with its
findings and other acts being subject to review by the courts. The
activities of the TRC were thereby endowed with the legitimacy
enjoyed by judicial institutions.10 9 Most importantly, where there was
sufficient evidence, the TRC attributed direct criminal responsibility
to a number of individuals, something that was not done by other
TRCs such as the one set up in Chile. 110
4. Lessons for Cuba
If some form of relief for human rights violations is allowed in a
post-transition Cuba, it will be necessary to create an agency or court
(or both, as was done in Sierra Leone) to adjudicate the claims and
administer appropriate remedies. The personnel in such an agency or
court will need relatively little expertise, but must function with
fairness and independence, particularly if the agency or court (or

106.
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, pmbl.,
available at http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/legal/act9534.htm.
107.
Bhargava, supra note 105, at 1306.
108.
Id. at 1308-09.
109.
Id. at 1309.
110.
See Paul van Zyl, Unfinished Business: The Truth and Reconciliation
Commission's Contribution to Justice in Post-Apartheid South Africa, in POSTCONFLICT JUSTICE, supra note 76, at 750.
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both) is established while elements friendly to the current
government are still in positions of power in Cuba.1 1 '
In addition, and perhaps independently of whether such agency
or court is established, the merits of establishing a TRC should be
carefully investigated. The South African TRC served as an effective
means of providing catharsis, closure, and redress to the many
unacknowledged abuses during apartheid. The same purpose could be
served in Cuba, and for that reason the establishment of a TRC after
112
the transition has been recommended by some experts.

III. PERMANENT

COURTS OF LIMITED JURISDICTION

A. Introduction
The discussion thus far has focused primarily on temporary
courts of limited jurisdiction. As noted above, these temporary and
specialized courts are designed to address particular problems
expected to arise during the initial stages of the transition to a free
market economy, such as resolution of property expropriation claims
and privatization of SOEs. But the shift to a free market economy is
likely to bring about enduring changes that will call for the
application of areas of law and concepts that have not been
significantly developed in Cuba; even if such features exist in pre-

ill.
The limited jurisdiction court established in Cambodia to redress the
human rights violations committed during the Khmer Rouge regime (1975-1979)
provides an example of a special court that failed its essential mission. See Steven R.
Ratner, Accountability for the Khmer Rouge: A (Lack of) Progress Report, in POSTCONFLICT JUSTICE, supra note 76, at 613. In 2001, under pressure from the United
Nations, the government passed a law allowing the creation of a hybrid tribunal
(composed of U.N.- and Cambodian-appointed judges) that would oversee the
prosecution of former Khmer Rouge leaders. Id. at 616. The law provided for a majority
of Cambodian judges (three of five) but required that all decisions be based on a
supermajority, reflecting the U.N.'s concern about the lack of judicial independence. Id.
In practice, since the government in power in Cambodia was still sympathetic to the
Khmer Rouge, the three government-appointed Cambodian judges would vote at the
orders of Cambodian prime minister, while the U.N.-appointed judges would vote to
the contrary, causing gridlock on every vote. Aaron J. Buckley, The Conflict in
Cambodia and Post-Conflict Justice, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, supra note 76, at 650.
Ultimately, convinced that the hybrid tribunal would not be independent, impartial or
objective, the United Nations withdrew from the program in February 2002. Id. at 652.
112.
E.g., Rolando Castafieda & George P. MontalvAn, Nunca Mds: Propuesta
Para Establecer la Comisidn Cubana de la Verdad y la ReconciliacidnNacional, in 13
CUBA IN TRANSITION: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING
OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY 204 (Ass'n for the Study
of Cuban Econ. 2003), available at http:/flanic.utexas.edu/project/asce/pdfs/volumel3/
castanedamontalvan.pdf.
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transition Cuba, the nation's centrally planned economy has inhibited
their growth.
Some examples of these legal areas include: (1) tax laws, (2)
bankruptcy laws, and (3) intellectual property laws. First, Cuba's
current dearth of private economic activity has not permitted tax law
to develop much during the past four decades. 113 Second, although
bankruptcy law is usually necessary in a free market system to
stimulate risk-taking economic activity and cushion the blow of
business failure, Cuba has not had much need for these laws given its
general prohibition of the kind of private enterprise such laws are
indirectly designed to encourage. 1 14 Finally, although Cuba does have
trademark, copyright, and patent laws, 115 these areas of the law have
not developed through the usual method of litigation over conflicting
rights because, among other reasons, private ownership of
intellectual property is generally not allowed in Cuba.
B. Tax Courts
Although Cuba currently has a tax law and taxes certain
activities, Cuba lacked a system of direct income taxation until
recently. 116 Some have also noted that Cuba does not have a
taxpaying culture. 117 Nevertheless, in 1994, Cuba introduced a
system of direct income taxation. 118 The system was designed

113.
See Archibald R. M. Ritter & JA. Turvey, The Tax Regime for MicroEnterprise in Cuba 26 (Carleton Econ. Papers, Working Paper No. 99-04, 2000),
available at http://www.carleton.ca/ economics/cep/cep99-04.pdf.
114.
See Ernesto Herndndez-CatA, Long-Term Objectives and Transitional
Policies: A Reflection on Pazos' "EconomicProblems of Cuba," in 1 CUBA IN TRANSITION:
PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY

36-57 (Latin Am. & Caribbean Ctr., Fla. Int'l Univ. 1992), available at
http:/[lanic.utexas.edulacb/cuba/ascelcubal/ehcata.html.
115.
Jesds Sanchelima, Selected Aspects of Cuba's Intellectual Property Laws, in
12 CUBA IN TRANSITION: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWELFTH ANNUAL MEETING

OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY 213 (Ass'n for the Study of Cuban Econ. 2002), available at
http://lanic.utexas.eduproject/asce/ pdfs/volume 12/sanchelima.pdf.
116.
IMPACT

See UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE ECONOMIC
OF U.S. SANCTIONS WITH
RESPECT TO
CUBA
3-16 (Feb.
2001)

http://hotdocs.usitc.gov/docs/pubs/332/pub3398.pdf (noting, among other things, that
Cuba basically lacked a taxation regime from 1967 to 1994).
117.
Ritter & Turvey, supra note 113, at 26.
118.
Cristian Oliver Lucas-Mas, The Cuban Tax System Through History,
http://www.tax.org/thp/ Articles/cuba.htm. Cuba's basic taxation framework consists of
Law 73-The Tax Systems Law, Gaceta Official (August 1994), and Decree-Law 169
(January 1997). See Matias F. Travieso-Diaz & Armando A. Musa, Cat on a Hot Tin
Roof: The Status of Current ForeignInvestors in a Post-TransitionCuba, supra note 29,
n. 102. Decree-Law 169 granted primary taxation authority to the Ministry of Finance,
and created the National Office of Tax Administration (ONAT). Id.

146

VANDERBILT/OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL, 39-125

primarily to tap into the sources of revenue being generated at the
time by newly legalized forms of self-employment. 119
The ability to raise revenues through the taxation of income is
limited by Cuba's centrally planned economy and the insolvency of
many SOEs. 120 As a result, the lack of free enterprise has diminished
the government's tax base and has precluded the development of a
sophisticated taxation system.
Once Cuba moves to a free market economic system, however,
the tax base is expected to broaden, and the Cuban government will
be able to derive increased revenue from the wider range of revenuegenerating activities likely to multiply within its borders. At the same
time, and for the same reasons, tax laws are expected to evolve in
order to capture the revenue that might otherwise be lost to the tax
avoidance schemes 12 1 likely to be devised in response to the advent of
more prevalent taxation.
As the tax laws multiply in number and complexity, 12 2 it is
inevitable that the government's quest to maximize tax revenues
combined with individuals' efforts to minimize the incidence of taxes
will spark disputes between the government and taxpayers. 123 These
disputes are likely to involve differing interpretations of the tax laws

119.
See Ritter & Turvey, supra note 113, at 3. The legalized economic activities
were primarily in the areas of transportation, housing services, and family and
personal services. See id. Decree-Law 141 limited self-employment to a subset of the
population, namely retirees, housewives, and laid-off workers. See id.
120.
See Matias Travieso-Diaz, Cuba's Perfeccionamiento Empresarial Law: A
Step Towards Privatization?,23 U. PA. J. INT'L. ECON. L. 119, 123 (2002).
121.
In the U.S., for example, it is estimated that the federal government loses
an average of $30 billion every year of identified taxes due to under- or non-payment of
taxes as well as to various tax avoidance schemes. Leonard E. Burman, Senior Fellow,
the Urban Inst. Codirector., the Tax Policy Ctr. Research Professor, Georgetown Pub.
Policy Inst., Remarks before The Committee on Ways and Means, United States House
of Representative, On Waste, Fraud, and Abuse 2 (July 17, 2003) (transcript available
online at http://www.urban.orgfUploadedPDF/ 900644.pdf). Also, many professional
service firms, both in the fields of law and accounting, have been known to peddle
sophisticated tax shelters that allow individuals to avoid payment of taxes that would
otherwise be due. See, e.g., Tom Herman, Tax Report: IRS Revises Rules for Advisors in
Shelter Crackdown, WALL ST.J., May 25, 2005, at D3; David Cay Johnston, Big
Accounting Firm's Tax Plans Help the Wealthy Conceal Income, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,
2002, at Al; David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. Closes Loophole that Let Rich Hide Income,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2002, at CI; David Cay Johnston, U.S. Proposes Regulations to
Restrict Some Tax Shelters for High Income People, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2002, at Cl.
122.
The U.S. tax code is one example of just how complex tax laws can become.
For instance, in an annual report to Congress, a senior tax policy official noted that
"Congress has made the tax code so complicated that even the Internal Revenue
Service is having trouble coping." David Cay Johnston, Report Calls for Simpler Taxes,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2005, at C2. Furthermore, the report urges Congress to take up
the simplification of the tax code, and notes that the current tax code is so complex and
confusing that "taxpayer compliance is on the wane." Id.
123.
See generally Lucas-Mas, supra note 118 (outlining Cuba's tax structure).
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and their application to various activities. Given that taxes are a
major source of financing for a government's activities, it is essential
that these tax disputes be resolved and adjudicated in the most costeffective and efficient manner.
One way for the government to maximize the efficiency and
reduce the cost of adjudicating tax disputes is to create specialized
tax courts. 124 These tax courts should be staffed by judges who have
received legal training in the interpretation and application of the tax
laws. 125 In the early stages of the transition, Cuba will probably have
to outsource this specialized legal training,126 because at that stage
Cuba will probably still lack the necessary know-how to conduct such
training. With time, however, as those individuals trained abroad
return to Cuba armed with such knowledge and begin to apply what
they have learned, that specialized legal training could be carried out
within the island.
Furthermore, each judge's decision should be published and
should serve as precedent for other judges to follow when
adjudicating factually and legally similar tax cases. This system of
precedent-based adjudication will lead to the development of a more
consistent body of tax law, and the level of certainty that such a welldeveloped body of law might engender could also have the salutary
12 7
effect of stimulating further economic activity on the island.

124.
See David Smith & Su Sun, Introducing Competition Policy into Developing
Economies: A Summary of Lessons Learned, 2 PERSPECTIVES, Feb. 28, 2001,
http://www.oycf.org/Perspectives/10_02280 1/introducing-competition-policy-i.htm.
125.
Some have argued, however, that such judicial specialization could give rise
to a host of problems such as judicial tunnel vision, lack of cross-pollination of legal
ideas, judicial capture by special interests, and excessive judicial policymaking. See
Sarang Vijay Damle, Note, Specialize the Judge, Not the Court: A Lesson from the
German Constitutional Court, 91 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1281 (2002). These Authors believe,
however, that the benefits of specialization will probably outweigh the costs. See id. at
1290-91.
126.
For example, Cuba could send these jurists abroad to study tax law in the
various tax LL.M. programs available in the United States. Although Cuban tax laws
are not expected to mirror U.S. tax laws, the United States provides a well-developed
body of tax law to which foreign jurists could apply a comparative law perspective,
borrowing only those aspects of the U.S. system that they find appealing.
127.
An analogy to this phenomenon exists in the realm of U.S. corporate law.
The State of Delaware has dedicated significant resources to attracting corporations to
the state. See Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History
and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 893 (1990). One of the reasons, if not the chief
reason, that corporations choose to incorporate in Delaware is that Delaware has over
the years managed to develop a large body of precedent-based corporate law. See id.
Whereas corporate law might not be as well-developed in other states, Delaware
provides corporations with a relatively certain set of legal rules within which
corporations are able to operate. See id. This core competency, in turn, has created a
sort of cottage industry for corporate-related services in Delaware. See id.
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C. Bankruptcy Courts
Bankruptcy courts have a long history in free market societies.
The term "bankruptcy" is derived from the Italian for "broken
bench. ' 128 In medieval and Renaissance Italy, when a merchant failed
to pay his debts, it was common practice for his creditors to get
129
together and break his bench, giving rise to the term banca rotta.
Historically, bankruptcy was considered a criminal offense, often
subjecting the debtor to various punishments ranging from debtor's
prison to the death penalty. 130 With the passage of time, however,
bankruptcy has lost much of its moral stigma and has been decriminalized. 131 But differences remain in how different countries and
cultures view and deal with insolvent debtors. 132 Nevertheless, with
the exception of bankruptcies involving fraud or other forms of
serious criminal mischief, most countries generally agree that
insolvency in and of itself is not an offense for which a person should
be severely punished.
Bankruptcy could be divided into two general categories. The
first involves individual, or consumer, debtors. The second involves
corporate, or business, debtors. Although many of the legal principles
are equally applicable to both categories, there are some differences
that stem from a recognition that consumers and businesses have
different concerns.
Consumer bankruptcy law traditionally allows debtors in
financial distress to discharge their debts and obtain a "fresh
start.'1 33 In the United States, discharge has usually taken the form

128.
See A Brief History of Bankruptcy in the U.S., http://www.bankruptcydata.
com/chllhistory.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
129.
See id.; Bankruptcy-What is Bankruptcy?, http://www.cpafinder.com/
bankruptcy-and.credit/bankruptcy--what-is-bankruptcy.html
(last visited Oct. 31,

2005).
130.
See Bankruptcy-What is Bankruptcy?, supra note 129.
131.
See id.
132.
Generally, the European model of bankruptcy, at least in the context of
threatened business insolvencies, concerns itself more with the social welfare of the
various affected individuals (e.g., workers, suppliers, etc.). See Why Should Bankruptcy
be Addressed on a European Level?, http://europea.eu.int.com/comm/enterprise/
entrepreneurship/support measures/failure bankruptcy/why.htm (last visited Oct. 31,
2005). Therefore, under the European model, the government is more likely to
intervene when a business is threatened with insolvency in order to stave off an actual
bankruptcy and its concomitant negative impact on various stakeholders. See id. In
contrast, the U.S. model of bankruptcy rarely results in governmental intervention to
stave off a business bankruptcy filing. See id. Rather, bankruptcy is viewed as a
market-based disciplining measure designed to streamline inefficiencies and promote
competition. See id.
133.
See Life After Bankruptcy, http://www.cpafinder.comlbankruptcy-andcredit/life-after-bankruptcy.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
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of a liquidation bankruptcy. 13 4 In a liquidation bankruptcy, all of a
debtor's non-exempt assets are sold and the proceeds are distributed
pro rata to the debtor's unsecured creditors; the amount by which the
debt exceeds the sales proceeds is legally discharged.
Although liquidation is always an option in business bankruptcy,
U.S. bankruptcy law focuses on reorganizing and rehabilitating the
debtor. 135 In doing so, the goal is to provide some breathing space for
the debtor to reorder its affairs and maximize its value to its
creditors. 136 In the business context, a liquidation is usually seen as
"leaving money on the table," where income-producing assets are sold
at fire-sale prices rather than used to pay-off creditors, as in a
37
reorgaruzation.1
In both cases, bankruptcy is a legal tool utilized both to protect a
debtor from aggressive creditors and to protect creditors from each
other. 138 Although the debtor-protection rationale is generally wellunderstood, the creditor-protection rationale is less understood. The
creditor-protection rationale stems from the view that bankruptcy is
also a collective remedy for creditors. 139 In the absence of such a
collective remedy, each creditor is pitted against the others as each
fights for the limited pool of assets held by the debtor. 140 In the
absence of a bankruptcy law, the rule is that "the first creditor to the
courthouse wins. '141 In other words, the first creditor to obtain a legal
judgment against the debtor is then able to levy against the debtor's
assets to satisfy the debt owed to that particular creditor. Of course,
this procedure leaves other creditors at a disadvantage and without
any source of repayment. Furthermore, the harsh consequences of
such a system serve only to intensify creditor aggressiveness as each
creditor seeks simultaneously and individually to obtain repayment
from the debtor's assets. Such a system is not conducive to economic
growth and prosperity.
On the other hand, the collective remedy of bankruptcy
immediately stops all unilateral creditor attempts to collect on their

134.
This is known in the United States as a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. See Chapter
7 Bankruptcy, http://www.cpafinder.com/bankruptcy-and-credit/chapter.7-bankruptcy.
html (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
135.
See Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Bankruptcy Law For Productivity, 37
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 51, 67 (2002).

136.
137.

See id. (noting the productivity-reviving function of bankruptcy).
Id. at 67-68.

138.

See generally ELIZABETH WARREN ET AL.,

THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND

CREDITORS (4th ed. 2001).
139.
Id.
140.
Georgakopoulos, supra note 135, at 69 (noting that each creditor's incentive
to grab assets results in an overall destruction of value).
141.
See Ronald J. Silverman & Mark W. Deveno, Distressed Sovereign Debt: A
Creditor'sPerspective, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 179, 191 (2003).
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debts in favor of a court-supervised method whereby each
143
unsecured 142 creditor is to be treated equally and fairly.
In the United States, Congress has set up a system of
bankruptcy courts staffed by specialized judges equipped to handle
the volume and complexity of bankruptcy cases. 144 That Congress has
chosen to set up such a separate system demonstrates the importance
145
that the bankruptcy laws have in a free market economy.
As Cuba starts to develop a free market economy, it should enact
a bankruptcy code 14 6 that will encourage individuals and emerging
companies to take potentially rewarding business risks without the
fear of an insurmountable amount of debt resulting from business
failure. For example, it is well-known that the bankruptcy laws in the
United States have been credited to some degree with the nation's
robust economic growth and prosperity.
In connection with the passage of a uniform bankruptcy law,
Cuba should create specialized bankruptcy courts to ensure the most
efficient and cost-effective administration of bankruptcy cases.
Staffed with a group of capable, independent bankruptcy judges,
bankruptcy courts would be conducive to a well-functioning

142.
Secured creditors are those who have taken certain steps, prescribed by
law, to secure their claims by designating specified assets of the debtor as collateral.
See Shu-Yi Oei, Rethinking the Jurisdiction of Bankruptcy Courts Over PostConfirmation Federal Tax Liabilities: Towards a New Jurisprudenceof 11 U.S.L. 505,
19 AKRON TAX J. 49, 64 (2004). Secured creditors are treated differently than unsecured
creditors in bankruptcy. See id. To the extent that a secured creditor has perfected its
security interest in collateral consisting of some of a debtor's assets, the secured
creditor will be allowed to take the "first bite at the apple" with regard to those assets.
See id. In other words, unsecured creditors are entitled to distributions only if there
remain any unencumbered assets after a properly perfected secured creditor has been
paid up to the value of its collateral. See id.
143.
See Kathryn R. Heidt, Future Claims in Bankruptcy: The NBC
Amendments Do not Go Far Enough, 69 AM. BANKR. L. J. 515, 520 (1995) (noting that
"equality is equity" is one of the principles underlying the U.S. bankruptcy laws).

144.
See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and
Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831, 832-33 (2000).
145.
In fact, the Framers of the U.S. Constitution considered the establishment
of a uniform bankruptcy law to be of such vital importance to the national interest that
they specifically mentioned bankruptcy as one of the enumerated powers to be given to
the federal government of limited powers. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 gives Congress
power to establish "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States."
146.

As pointed out in THE LAWS AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF A FREE-MARKET CUBA,

supra note 17, Cuba's bankruptcy law should probably incorporate features of both the
"liquidation model" and the "reorganization model" of bankruptcy, as both serve useful
purposes in different contexts. Cuba could also look to Hungary's experience for further
ideas. For example, in 1986, Hungary became the first communist country to enact a
bankruptcy law that sought, in part, to induce enterprises to become more profitable
and less reliant on government subsidies. See Paul H. Rubin, Growing a Legal System
in Post-Communist Economics, 27 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 1, 16 (1994).
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bankruptcy system that is so important for the establishment and
maintenance of a vibrant economy.
D. Intellectual Property Courts
The term "intellectual property law" is an umbrella term that
refers to the laws of copyrights, patents, and trademarks. 147 Although
Cuba currently has intellectual property laws on its books, 148 the
laws are not administered by one body, but rather by an amalgam of
different government agencies and judicial bodies. 149 Cuba's
intellectual property laws currently do not affect the Cuban people
much, given that Cuba outlaws most forms of private property. 150 The
transition to a free market economy, however, is likely to liberalize
private property rights. In turn, intellectual property rights are likely
to play an increasingly important role as Cuba progresses in its
transition.
If the situation in the United States is any indication, a
successor Cuban government would be well-advised to set up a
system of specialized courts to adjudicate intellectual property
disputes. In recent years, the United States has witnessed an
explosive growth in complex technological and intellectual property
cases. 151 These cases have often presented novel issues that have
strained the adjudicatory ability of generalist judges who possess
152
limited knowledge of these specialized areas.

147.
As with bankruptcy law, intellectual property law was deemed important
enough to the national interests of the United States that the Framers of the
Constitution specifically granted Congress the power to "promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8. Although this constitutional provision deals only with patents and copyrights,
Congress has taken steps to federalize trademark law with passage of the Lanham Act.
See Rashida Y.U. MacMurray, Trademarks of Copyrights: Which Intellectual Property
Right Affords Its Owner the Greatest Protection of Architectural Ingenuity?, 3 N.W. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 111, 124 (2005).
148.
Cuba's patent law is codified in Decree-Law 68 of May 14, 1983; its
trademark law is codified in Decree-Law 293 of May 2, 2000; and its copyright law is
codified in Law No. 14 of Dec. 28, 1977. See Jesus (Jay) Sanchelima, Selected Aspects of
Cuban Intellectual Property Laws, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 377, 378, 380, 383 (2003).
149.
See id. at 379, 382-83.
150.
Id. at 382.
151.
See LeRoy L. Kondo, Untangling The Tangled Web: Federal Court Reform
Through Specialization For Internet Law And Other High Technology Cases, 2002
UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 1 (2002).
152.
Id. at 3 ("The 'tangled web' of legal and scientific complexity experienced in
the aftermath of explosive technological growth in this new millennium may be
'untangled', at least in part, through court reform by implementing policies of increased
specialization within the judiciary.").
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As mentioned earlier, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is a specialized court that deals primarily with intellectual
property cases. 153 The Federal Circuit has been credited by some with
significantly advancing the development of patent law doctrine and
with building the "major pillars of novel computer software
technologies, biotechnology developments, and business methods. '154
Also, commentators, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have noted
the Federal Circuit's success in achieving the desirable policy goals of
providing "uniformity, order and predictability to a complex body of
law."'1 55 In fact, it has been noted that the Federal Circuit has in
essence become the de facto "court of last resort" for intellectual
property and, particularly, patent cases, as evidenced by the high rate
of Supreme Court denials of certiorari to intellectual property cases
1 56
resolved by the Federal Circuit.
In addition to the United States, several other countries have
established some form of specialized intellectual property courts. 157
Approximately eleven countries have developed specialized courts or
tribunals that hear only intellectual property cases, 158 and
approximately twenty-five countries have courts of general
jurisdiction that have specialized divisions that hear intellectual
property cases exclusively. 159 Cuba, however, has indicated that it
does "not have specialised IP courts, and [is] not currently
contemplating the creation of specialised IP courts.' 160 For the
reasons stated above, a successor Cuban government would do well in
considering the creation of courts of limited jurisdiction to deal with
the complex intellectual property issues likely to arise post-transition.

153.
Id. at 5. The Federal Circuit also hears cases involving the U.S.
International Trade Commission, the Federal Tort Claims Act, and the Merit System
Protection Board. Id. Because the Federal Circuit is an appellate court, however, the
intellectual property cases it reviews have first been decided by lower courts (i.e., U.S.
district courts) staffed by generalist judges. See id.
154.
Id. at 17.
155.
Id. at 18.
156.
Id. at 18-19.
157.
See International Bar Association Intellectual Property and Entertainment

Committee, International Survey of Specialised Intellectual Property Courts and
Tribunals 7, http://www.comml-iba.org/attachmentlarticles/88/FinalInternationalIP
Survey-edited-clean_28-02-05.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2005) [hereinafter Specialized IP
Court Survey].
158.
Id. at 8-9. Examples include Korea, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom,
Australia, China, Jamaica, Kenya, New Zealand, Singapore, and Zimbabwe. Id.
159.
Id. at 10. Examples include Brazil, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Norway,
Pakistan, Panama, Romania, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, Taiwan, and the Netherlands. Id. at 10-12.
160.
Id. at 29.
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IV. STAFFING OF COURTS OF LIMITED JURISDICTION

A. Introduction
One of the greatest challenges that will face a transition
government in Cuba is to deploy a sufficient number of qualified
judges and other personnel to oversee the reform of the legal system
while also staffing both the courts of general jurisdiction and newly
established specialized courts. 16 1 This challenge will be aggravated if,
as some propose, some members of the current judiciary are
dismissed or excluded from participation in the post-transition court
1 62
system due to their association with the current regime.
The judges that will preside over the courts of limited
jurisdiction-whose creation this Article advocates-will need to
either come from the existing court system (subject to the necessary
retraining) or serve as newly appointed jurists. Most likely, both
methods will have to be utilized over time.
B. Training of Existing Judges
Those among Cuba's current judges who are appointed to
specialized courts will have to be trained on the fundamental legal
and technical principles applicable to their new specialty. Some form
of institutionalized legal education will be most effective in helping
judges make this transition. Cuba will probably need both short-term
and long-term plans for retraining its judges. A short-term plan
would involve the assistance of foreign aid for training in specialized
areas, while over the long term Cuba may want to establish a
program of continuing legal education for its judges. Models and
resources are available to assist the transition government in the
implementation of both plans.
1. Short-Term Retraining
Countries making the transition from socialism to a free market
economy have instituted crash programs to make their judiciaries
better able to address the new issues presented by the changed

161.
See generally Patallo Sinchez, supra note 12.
162.
See, e.g., Mario Diaz-Cruz, III, Challenges for a TransitionalJudiciary in a
Post-Castro Cuba, in 12 CUBA IN TRANSITION 304, 305 (2002), http://lanic.utexas.edu/
project/asce/pdfs/volumel2/diazcruz.pdf (arguing that Cuba should exclude some judges
from participating in a post-Castro judiciary). The exclusion of former communists
from participation in post-communist governments (lustration) has taken place in some
former Eastern Bloc countries, such as the former Czechoslovakia and Poland. Id.
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economic order.163 Judicial training centers (JTCs) have been
established in nineteen countries across central and eastern Europe
to educate judges about legal changes wrought by a transition to
democracy. 16 4 The JTCs provide short-term training in the form of
seminars, workshops, and other structured and unstructured
instruction tailored to the needs of the specific judges being
trained. 165 This type of training is consistent with current trends in
66
judicial education.'
It is outside the scope of this Article to discuss in detail the
training programs that existing members of the Cuban judiciary
should receive in order to be able to serve in courts of limited
jurisdiction. But there is a wealth of information available on the
appropriate methodology for such training, and general guidelines
have been developed for the organization of judicial training
16 7
programs.
There are a number of international organizations that could
lend technical and financial support to a JTC program in Cuba. It has
also been recommended that the United States include judicial
training as one of the elements of an aid package to be made available
68
to a transition government in Cuba.'
2. Continuing Legal Education
Judges in courts of limited jurisdiction will need continuing
training to keep abreast of changes in the law in their areas of
specialization (e.g., changes in the tax regime). In establishing some
form of continuing legal education, the following considerations must
be made: (1) whether the program will be run by the government or a
non-government entity, (2) who will teach the judges, and (3) whether
the program will be voluntary or mandatory.

163.
The World Bank has sponsored a number of these programs. See The World
Bank
Group,
Introduction
to
Legal
and
Judicial
Reform
Projects,
http://www4.worldbank.org/legalleglr/introduction.html.
164.
See American Bar Association, Judicial Training Center Network,
http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/special-projects/ tc/home.html.
165.
See American Bar Association, The Judicial Educational Center of the
Council of Court Chairman of the Republic of Armenia, http://www.abanet.org/ceelil
special-projects/jtc/armenia_04schedule.html (showing an example of the training
curriculum for a JTC).
166.
See LIVINGSTON ARMYTAGE, JUDGES AS LEARNERS: REFLECTIONS ON
PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 1 (2004), http://www.nji.ca/internationalForuniArmytage%

201.pdf [hereinafter ARMYTAGE].
167.
See, e.g., id. at 15.
168.
See COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE, COMMISSION FOR ASSISTANCE
TO A FREE CUBA: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 194 (2004), http://www.state.gov/

documents/organization32334.pdf.
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a. Government versus Non-Government Sponsorship
Continuing legal education (CLE) programs in transitioning
countries have varied in institutional structure. Some countries have
established a single institution in charge of overseeing all CLE
programs, while other countries allow various organizations to run
CLE programs. 16 9 Some countries have both types of CLE programs.
Single institution CLE programs can be conducted by either
government or non-government entities. Mongolia's CLE program is
run by a government-owned non-profit organization that operates
under the Ministry of Justice. 170 On the other hand, Bulgaria's CLE
program, the Bulgarian Magistrate Training Center, was established
as a non-governmental, non-profit organization (although it is
expected to eventually become a state institution). 171 Macedonia
carries out its CLE through the Macedonian Center for Continuing
Education, which operates under the auspices of the Macedonian
Judges Association. 172 Regardless of whether CLE functions as part
of the government or as a non-government entity, the program should
be organized so as to prevent governmental interference with judicial
education.
Where a government-controlled institution oversees the CLE
program for judges, the composition of the oversight institution may
vary. The most popular governing structure seems to mix government
officials, judges, and other legal professionals. For example, the
Bulgarian Center's Board of Directors comprises top ranking officials
from the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. 173 A Board of
Directors composed of officials from the Ministry of Education and
Culture, the Supreme Court, and the National University Law School
oversee the CLE program in Uruguay as part of the Centro de
Estudios Juridicos de Uruguay. 74 The Mongolian CLE program's
Governing Board is chaired by the State Secretary of the Ministry of
Justice and Home Affairs, while the chair of the Judicial Education
175
Subcommittee is a Supreme Court Justice.

169.
Mary Francis Edwards, Getting Continuing Legal Education Started in a
Developing Country 1, http://www.nji.ca/internationalForum/02_Getting%20CJE%20_
mary%20frances%20edwards.pdf.
170.
See id.
171.
See American Bar Association, Bulgaria Magistrate Training Center,
http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/special-projects/jtclbulgaria.html. Bulgaria also allows for
non-profit legal organizations to carry out CLE programs. See id.
172.
See USAID, USAID's Rule of Law Project, http://www.usaid.org.mk/
English/DG/Rule of Law-eng.htm.
173.
See Bulgaria Magistrate Training Center, supra note 171.
174.
See Joseph R. Thome, Heading South But Looking North: Globalizationand
Law Reform in Latin America, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 691, 709 (2000).

175.

Edwards, supra note 169, at 1-2.
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b. Teachers
While many judicial training programs in transitioning countries
have been taught by foreigners, judicial reform strategists
recommend that a sustainable CLE program should be taught by
local professionals, preferably judges. 176 Successful CLE programs
have also utilized lawyers with specialized areas of expertise, as well
as non-legal professionals who specialize in other disciplines. Judges,
however, prefer to learn from other local judges because of their
practical experience and because they have a better understanding of
their country's legal context than foreigners. A second reason to have
local judges teach is that local judges will remain in the country after
foreign assistance has left.
CLE teachers need not dedicate their full efforts to such
teaching. Mongolia, for example, hires CLE faculty to work only parttime. 177 Under such an arrangement, faculty members can maintain
their careers, but still provide teaching services. Cuba may need to
provide flexible programs that maximize the availability of competent
CLE teachers.
c. Mandatory versus Non-Mandatory CLE
Not all countries in transition require judges to participate in
CLE. Countries often, however, provide incentives for judges to
participate in CLE. 178 For example, in Chile, for judges to be
considered for promotion, they should take at least one CLE
179
course.
It should be anticipated that countries with a more structured
CLE program (including compulsory CLE training) will be more
successful in sustaining judicial reforms.

176.
See, NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE JUDICIAL EDUCATORS, PRINCIPLES & STANDARDS
OF CONTINUING JUDICIAL EDUCATION, 21, 12 (1991); see also Kara L. Flanery de Tichoc,

JudicialReform in the Development Agenda: The Case of Guatemala, (Center for Latin
American
Studies, Georgetown
Univ. 2003), http://www.georgetown.edu/sfs/
programs/clas/Pubs/entre2003/ udicial.html.
177.
See National Center for State Courts, Partnering to Facilitate the
Evolution of Justices Worldwide, www.ncsconline.org, follow "International" tab.
178.
In some countries CLE is compulsory. In Armenia, for example, "[ludges
are obligated to attend mandatory trainings for 36 hours per year." See American Bar
Association, The Judicial Educational Center of the Council of Court Chairman of the
Republic of Armenia, http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/special-projects/jtcarmenia.html
[hereinafter Armenia].
179.
See Global Judges Forum, Rio de Janeiro, at 10-11 (2004),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/GILD/Resources/Court-Practices-Report-GJF-2004.
doc.
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C. Trainingof New Judges
The two major models of judicial education and training are the
civil system and the common law system. In a civil model, law school
1 80
graduates are appointed as judges for the term of their careers.
Students achieve the required level of competence before a judicial
appointment. 18 '
In the common law model, judges are selected from a pool of
experienced lawyers. Legal education is meant to facilitate a
transition to the judicial role and the application of the competencies
82
already developed from practicing as a lawyer.'
A civil model would serve the needs of specialized courts because
it provides a structured, institutionalized, and predictable framework
for the training and appointment of judges. It would be an easy step
to include specialized training in the areas of interest to the
specialized courts as part of the judicial education curriculum. On the
other hand, the common law model has the advantage that the
lawyers appointed to the specialized courts would have practical
experience and knowledge in the areas of interest from the outset.
Many central and eastern European countries use a combination
of the two approaches to obtain new judges.' 8 3 Judicial qualification
and preparation in these countries offer judicial careers for both
recent law school graduates and practitioners. In some countries, only
the completion of a higher education course of studies, and not
necessarily any legal training education, is required to become a
judge.' 8 4 Such an approach makes sense in countries transitioning to
democracy, where there is a need for a large pool of applicants to
draw from to fill newly created (or newly available) positions. This
dual approach should also be employed in Cuba.

180.
181.

See ARMYTAGE, supra note 166, at 16.
See id.

Alternatively, judges could enter the judicial school after law school, as [is the
practice] in Spain. Spanish judicial candidates are trained specifically to serve
as judges in particular courts including commercial, civil, or criminal courts.
The qualifications to serve on each differ and the candidates receive in depth
training and education in both procedural and substantive laws that are
regularly addressed in those courts.
SANCHEZ, supra note 161, at 29.
182.
ARMYTAGE, supra note 166, at 16.
183.
See, e.g., American Bar Association, Croatia (2002), http://www.abanet.org/
ceel~icountries/croatia/legalinfo.html.
184.

Id.

158

VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 39:125

D. Use of Non-JudicialPersonnel in Courts of Limited Jurisdiction
Non-judicial personnel (lawyers and non-lawyers) can serve in a
judicial capacity in a variety of ways. In specialized courts, nonjudges serve as lay judges, conciliators, arbitrators, and justices of the
peace.' 8 5 Judicial systems that employ lay judges usually place them
on panels alongside professional judges.' 8 6 Staffing courts entirely
with non-judges is unlikely to result in adequate administration of
18 7
justice.
Hiring requirements for lay judges range from minimal
education to higher education combined with a requisite number of
years of legal experience. Not all countries require that lay judges
have legal training. For example, to serve in the Constitutional Court
in Armenia, one need only have completed some type of higher
education and worked ten years in the legal, governmental, or
scientific fields.' 88
Non-lawyer judges are generally chosen, either by the
community or the judiciary, based on their high moral standing in the
community and special knowledge or experience. Some countries only
require non-lawyer judges to be a certain minimum age and without a
criminal record.18 9 Other countries require non-lawyer judges to have
completed higher education and a certain number of years of
professional experience. 190 Lay judges in specialized courts are often
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Kent Anderson & Mark Nolan, Lay Participationin the Japanese Justice
System: A Few Preliminary Thoughts Regarding the Lay Assessor System (saiban-in
seido) from Domestic Historical and InternationalPsychologicalPerspectives, 37 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 935, 966-70 (2004) (noting that Japan uses non-lawyer judges to
guide the lowest and highest courts in Japan). Lay judges in Japan hear civil cases in
courts of limited jurisdiction. Id. at 967. These judges are only required to pass a
general civil servant's exam and be employed by the court system or justice ministry
for three years. Id. Japan also employs lay judges as Supreme Court justices with the
intent of maintaining one-third of the bench as non-lawyers. Id. Lay judges also act as
conciliators. Id. at 969.
186.
France and Germany are examples of such countries. See id. at 974.
187.
In an extreme case, the government of Rwanda staffed a brand new
judiciary with almost entirely non-lawyers to handle the tremendous caseload resulting
from the genocide killings. See Maya Goldstein-Bolocan, Rwandan Gacaca: An
Experiment in Transitional Justice, 2004 J. Disp. RESOL. 355, 381, 387 (2005). The
newly elected judges were inadequately trained, spending only six days in judicial
training seminars. Id. at 386. As would be expected, the work of these judges was
considered inadequate. Id.
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See Armenia, supra note 178.
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See Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 187, at 381.
190.
See Armenia, supra note 178.

20061

COURTS IN POST-TRANSITION CUBA

required to be experts in a specific area relevant to the jurisdiction of
the court. 19 1
Countries have been able to benefit from the selection of judges
for courts of limited jurisdiction from among a pool of professionals
specialized in specific areas. Specialized professionals seem to work
well on panels with professional judges because they contribute
subject matter expertise to complement the legal analysis.
Cuba's courts of limited jurisdiction will benefit from, and may
require, the inclusion in their ranks of lay personnel-professionals
with specialized knowledge if not legal training. Such lay personnel
could serve, in a strictly advisory capacity, on panels with judges, and
should have such training or experience to add value to the court's
deliberations.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It is beyond dispute that implementation of the necessary
changes to Cuba's legal institutions must be at the core of Cuba's
market transition. It is also very likely that instituting the required
changes to the legal system in a short timeframe may be beyond the
transition government's capabilities. In particular, the Cuban
judiciary-already small in number and perhaps further thinned out
by the implementation of lustration measures-may be unable to cope
with the gargantuan task of applying the transition period laws and
managing the flood of litigation that may ensue as a result of the
country's legal and economic changes. At a minimum, Cuba should
consider establishing courts of limited jurisdiction in the areas
discussed in this Article as a way to relieve court congestion and
provide timely access to justice to the people.
In addition, the Cuban government should work with the
governments of interested countries, particularly the United States,
and international lending institutions such as the World Bank. From
these entities, Cuba should obtain technical assistance in the
development of programs to train, qualify, and deploy at least the
minimum number of qualified judges and other legal practitioners
that would permit the sustained progress of the transition process.
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See Paul Edward Geller, Staffing the Judiciary and "Tastes" in Justice: A
Commentary on the Papers by Professors Bell and Clark, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1849, 1852
(1988).

